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COMMENTARY

Goliath versus Goliath in high-stakes MBS litigation
By Bradley T. Borden and David J. Reiss
Brooklyn Law School

The loan-origination and mortgagesecuritization practices between 2000 and
2007 created the housing and mortgagebacked securities bubble that precipitated the
2008 economic crisis and ensuing recession.
The mess that the loan-origination and
mortgage-securitization practices caused is
now playing out in courts around the world.
MBS investors are suing banks, MBS sponsors
and underwriters for misrepresenting the
quality of loans purportedly held in MBS
pools and failing to properly transfer loan
documents and mortgages to the pools, as
required by the MBS pooling and servicing
agreements. State and federal prosecutors
have also filed claims against banks,
underwriters and sponsors for the roles they
played in creating defective MBS and for
misrepresenting the quality of the assets
purportedly held in MBS pools.
An Australian federal court ruled in favor of
plaintiffs who sued Standard & Poor’s for
misrepresentations it made in its ratings of
MBS.1 The U.S. Department of Justice and
California attorney general have since filed
lawsuits against S&P.2
Finally, a line of cases against insurers of the
mortgage notes is working through the court
system. All of this litigation is in addition
to litigation between banks and borrowers
regarding the validity of mortgages and
mortgage notes, as well as the standing

of banks to bring foreclosure actions or
establish standing in bankruptcy cases.
The lawsuits by MBS investors and
prosecutors (upstream litigation) and
litigation involving borrowers (downstream
litigation) has banks, sponsors, underwriters
and ratings agencies in a vice. The amount
of downstream and upstream litigation
continues to grow.3
With downstream
litigation cases being decided, the contours
of the law regarding banks’ standing to
foreclose on defaulted loans and to join
bankruptcy proceedings of borrowers are
beginning to emerge.

Even though the stakes are high for the
litigants in this area, decisions in any of these
cases should affect behavior and practices
in the financial industry. If the decisions
deter the type of activity and practices that
precipitated the financial crises, they will
add stability to the financial markets and the

The litigation in this area is still relatively new, but with
hundreds of billions of dollars at stake, it will likely last for years
to come and should reshape the MBS landscape.
On the other hand, the numerous upstream
complaints filed and few published decisions
(most regarding motions for summary
judgment) provide just an outline of the
claims investors and prosecutors are making
against banks, promoters, underwriters and
ratings agencies in upstream MBS litigation.
This commentary focuses on the state of
this upstream litigation. It reviews claims
of several complaints and discusses some
decisions on motions for summary judgment
in several of the cases. The commentary is
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not a comprehensive review of all the activity
in this area, but it does provide an overview
of the issues at stake in this litigation. The
litigation in this area is still relatively new, but
with hundreds of billions of dollars at stake,
it will likely last for years to come and should
reshape the MBS landscape.

world economy. Thus, the stakes are much
higher than the significant sums directly at
controversy in these cases.

LAWSUITS AGAINST BANKS AND
MBS SPONSORS
Numerous lawsuits against banks and MBS
sponsors are winding their way through
various state and federal courts.4
The allegations in lawsuits brought by
investors and prosecutors are similar.
Generally, the allegations focus on
misrepresentations sponsors made in MBS
offering materials. First, they say sponsors
represented that securitized loans were
originated in accordance with specified
underwriting guidelines, and the sponsors
engaged in due diligence to ensure the
quality of the loans. The plaintiffs allege,
however, that in MBS pools, the sponsors
routinely included mortgages deviating from
the stated loan origination and underwriting
standards.
They also allege sponsors
knowingly securitized loans that a due
diligence vendor deemed to be defectively
underwritten, and they off-loaded the worse
loans from their balance sheets.
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Second, plaintiffs claim that sponsors
downplayed the risk of borrower default
by presenting misleading borrower credit
scores and overstating the number of loans
secured by owner-occupied residences.
Several alleged sponsor practices suggest
that they knew loans were of poor quality
but transferred them to the MBS trusts. For
example, plaintiffs say sponsors expressly
instructed due diligence vendors not to
verify occupancy status or credit scores
and to make up data. Allegedly, sponsors
knew that originators purposefully steered
borrowers to high-risk mortgages and
granted loans without establishing credit
scores. They also allegedly securitized loans
before the expiration of the early payment
default period because mortgages (despite
the likelihood of default) are not technically
in default before that time.
Third, complaints assert that sponsors knew
the value of the property collateralizing
the loans was much lower than what they
represented in offering materials. The
allegations claim originators blacklisted
appraisers who refused to inflate collateral
values, and sponsors instructed due diligence
vendors not to review appraisals. They also
claim sponsors falsely represented that loans
with high loan-to-value ratios were restricted
to particularly creditworthy borrowers.
Complaints also allege that sponsors failed
to disclose the deliberate effort to undermine
the due diligence processes, resulting in false
and misleading MBS ratings. The allegations
also say sponsors further compromised the
integrity of the credit ratings by pressuring
rating agencies to provide the highest ratings
for their MBS.
Fourth, complaints contend that executives
aided and abetted fraud. The allegations
say high-level executives helped create
policies encouraging high-risk lending
and reduced controls to increase profits by
creating greater numbers of MBS regardless
of quality. Finally, these complaints allege
that sponsors negligently misrepresented
information.

Defenses
Sponsors’ primary defense to those
allegations appears to be that they disclosed
risks associated with purchasing MBS and that
the downturn in the market caused the loss,
not their wrongdoing. Sponsors also argue
that the plaintiffs were highly sophisticated
financial institutions with significant
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experience in the mortgage industry, so
their reliance on the representations in the
offering documents was unjustified.

Status of lawsuits
Most lawsuits are still in the pre-trial phase,
but several courts have published rulings
on motions to dismiss. Some early rulings
granted the motions,5 but more recent rulings
allow lawsuits to proceed. For example, the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York denied the sponsor’s motion to
dismiss a claim on all grounds.6 The court
held that the plaintiffs alleged facts that, if

that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged
facts (such as the defendants pressuring
the appraisers and rating agencies into
increasing their evaluations) that call into
question the factual bases for the appraisal
and rating evaluations. The court also found
that the plaintiffs presented sufficient facts
to show that the defendant had the requisite
motive (to obtain high credit ratings to sell
the MBS certificates), the defendants knew
or should have known that the loans violated
underwriting standards, and the appraisals
did not satisfy industry standards.

Generally, the allegations focus on misrepresentations
sponsors made in MBS offering materials.
true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level, the standard
that applies to motions to dismiss a claim
in federal court.7 Thus, the court denied
the sponsor’s motion to dismiss state law
claims of fraud, fraudulent inducement,
aiding and abetting fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation. The court found that
disclaimers in offering documents regarding
the possibility that some loans might fail to
satisfy the underwriting requirements were
insufficient to put the investors on notice that
the sponsors generally did not follow the
underwriting guidelines.
Offering documents also disclosed that
some loans could not meet the definition of
delinquent because they were transferred to
the MBS pool before the due date of the first
payment. The court found that disclosure
was not sufficient to address the sponsor’s
policy of transferring mortgage notes before
the early payment default period expired.
The court determined that the language
in fact suggested that the sponsor should
have made a disclosure relating to the
early payment default period. Apparently,
the court believes the sponsor should have
disclosed that the notes would not fall
within the definition of delinquent because
insufficient time had passed to test the
borrowers.
Regarding the value of collateral, the
sponsors claim that language in the offering
materials specifically warned that the value of
property could fluctuate, extraneous reports
warned of possible fluctuations in property
values and valuations of appraisers were
merely opinions. The court found, however,
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Finally, the court found that despite the
plaintiff’s sophistication in financial matters,
it had adequately alleged that no outside
information could have led to the discovery
of the defendants’ fraudulent practices.
Consequently, the court denied the motion
to dismiss.

LAWSUITS AGAINST RATING
AGENCIES
Two lawsuits (one brought by the Department
of Justice and the other by the California
attorney general) in California against S&P
illustrate the types of claims that credit
ratings agencies face in the United States.
The DOJ’s complaint alleges that S&P
committed mail fraud, wire fraud and
financial institution fraud.8 The premise
of these allegations is that S&P presented
itself as providing high-quality, objective,
independent and rigorous analytical
information to the marketplace. Allegedly,
however, it was financially beholden to the
sponsors of MBS and CDO securities (a
collateral debt obligation is an interest in
a pool of MBS), resulting in numerous bad
actions. The DOJ claims that S&P ignored
information about the underlying mortgages
held in RMBS trusts and MBS tranches held
by CDOs and that it intentionally failed
to implement programs that would have
returned more objective ratings.
The lawsuit alleges that S&P’s desire to
increase profit by satisfying sponsors of
CDOs and MBS was its motive for ignoring
information about the underlying assets
and downplaying risk. The DOJ relies upon

© 2013 Thomson Reuters

S&P internal communications revealing a
particular sensitivity to demands and input
from sponsors who wanted favorable credit
ratings. The DOJ said S&P lowered its criteria
for rating CDOs of real estate assets to keep
from losing deals.
The DOJ also claims that S&P did not update
the model it used to analyze MBS because
doing so would have led to lower ratings,
which would have caused S&P to lose
business. Internal documents also suggest
S&P knew that mortgage loans underlying
many MBS were underperforming, which
should have adversely affected ratings, but
S&P did not adjust the ratings to account for
such underperformance. The complaint lists
several CDOs that S&P rated at investment
grade, which lost value and resulted in severe
loss for several purchasers who fall within
the jurisdiction of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989.

Defenses
In support of its motion to dismiss, S&P
argues first that the statements the DOJ
relies upon cannot be the basis for a finding
of fraud under federal law.9 Second, S&P
argues that the complaint does not allege
that S&P’s opinions were false and fraudulent
due to S&P believing them at the time they
were made. S&P presents the internal
communication as “robust internal debate.”
Third, S&P argues that the complaint fails
to allege that it had the requisite intent
to defraud the investors of CDOs. For
instance, S&P argues that Citibank and Bank
of America, which purchased CDOs, also
created the very CDOs at issue. S&P also
argues that the investors did not pay the
ratings fees, but the sponsors did.
S&P asserts that its ratings were objective,
independent and uninfluenced by conflicts of
interest and that the DOJ’s claims relate to
subjective statements that are not actionable.
First, S&P argues that general statements it
made about its services, integrity, credibility
and objectivity do not support a claim of
fraud. Instead, S&P argues, such statements
are non-actionable puffery. Second, S&P
argues that statements about its mission are
aspirational and non-actionable statements
that are not representations of current
activity. Third, S&P argues that statements
it made regarding its policy and code of
conduct are not actionable statements of
objective facts. Finally, S&P argues that
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information about its ratings processes are
neither quantifiable nor substantive enough
to offer any specific qualitative guidance and
are too general to serve as a basis for a fraud
claim.
S&P also argued that the DOJ failed to
sufficiently plead that the credit ratings were
objectively false or that S&P subjectively
disbelieved them on the date of issue. S&P
claims that the DOJ’s failure to identify the
true credit risk associated with any of the
securities at issue was a failure to plead
with sufficient particularity that the ratings
were incorrect or misleading. S&P also
claims that the DOJ failed to plead with
sufficient particularity that the ratings did
not reflect S&P’s current opinion. Among
other defenses on this point, S&P argues that
the DOJ cannot know whether S&P took into
account updated information about RMBS
ratings when it rated CDOs.

Disclaimers in offering
documents regarding the
possibility that some loans
might fail to satisfy the
underwriting requirements
were insufficient to put the
investors on notice.
Status of lawsuits
The DOJ suit awaits the court’s ruling on
S&P’s motion for summary judgment, but
other courts have acted on other motions to
dismiss in securities fraud suits against S&P.
For example, the 2nd Circuit upheld the
dismissal of a securities fraud lawsuit against
S&P executives because the complaint failed
to state a claim with sufficient particularity.10
The plaintiff shareholders in that case sued
McGraw-Hill Cos (S&P’s parent company),
and two of its corporate officers for making
false and misleading statements about
the operations of S&P. The court held
that statements about S&P’s integrity,
transparency and independence were puffery
and did not support a securities fraud claim.
The court also held that claims about S&P’s
surveillance practices did not come within the
definition of misleading, and S&P’s failure to
disclose that accurately reported earnings
were unsustainable is not securities fraud.
The court also found that the plaintiffs had
not presented facts supporting the inference

that the defendants knew of facts or had
access to information that contradicted their
statements.
The court also concluded that the statements
the plaintiffs claimed were misleading
were not material because they would not
alter the decision to invest in the McGrawHill stock. The court took issue with the
complaint because it consisted of large block
quotations and italicized text with claims that
statements in the text were materially false
and misleading. The court held that such a
presentation of material does not state with
specificity how each statement is materially
false or misleading. These findings led the
court to dismiss the shareholder suit against
S&P.
The complaints filed by the DOJ and California
attorney general are distinguishable from this
2nd Circuit case as the DOJ and California
cases are not securities fraud cases brought
by S&P shareholders. It will be interesting to
see if the courts in California reach a different
result based upon different legal theories.

LAWSUITS BY MONOLINE INSURERS
AGAINST SPONSORS
Monoline insurers evaluate the likelihood
that an MBS trust will default on any of its
obligations. They then acquire sufficient
comfort from the sponsor and the strength
of the collateral that the risk of default is
manageable, given the premium they charge
for the insurance. Monoline insurers, who
effectively ensure that investors in MBS
receive payments in a timely manner, have
brought lawsuits against the MBS sponsors,
claiming the sponsors committed fraud or
made misrepresentations regarding the
quality of mortgages underlying the MBS.
In one typical case (the EMC case), monoline
insurer Assured Guaranty Corp. alleged
“that Bear Stearns grossly misrepresented
the risk of the underlying pooled loans”
used as collateral in MBS deals that it
had underwritten.11 Assured alleged that
loan warranties in nearly 90 percent of the
loans in one of the pools at issue had been
breached. As a result, Assured claimed that
the defendants breached the representations
and warranties and the agreement. The New
York trial court said that more than half of
the loans in that pool had either “defaulted
or are seriously delinquent.” Bear Stearns’
successor-in-interest refused to re-purchase
the breaching loans as required by their
agreement.
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In another typical case (the Flagstar
case), Assured Guaranty Municipal Cor.,
another Assured subsidiary, alleged “that
the loans underlying the securities were
either materially fraudulent or were the
product of material underwriting defects, in
breach of Flagstar’s [the sponsor’s] express
representations and warranties.”12 Assured
thus argued that it was “entitled to be
reimbursed for its payment of insurance
claims that arose when many of the
underlying loans defaulted,” and Flagstar
thereafter “refused to cure the defects or
substitute eligible loans.”

Defenses
Sponsors
argue
that
they
have
materially complied with the contractual
representations and warranties as well as

The Justice Department said
S&P lowered its criteria for
rating CDOs of real estate
assets to keep from losing
deals.
their re-purchase or substitution obligations,
and the ensuing litigation can focus on a loan
by loan analysis to determine who is right.

Status of the lawsuits
In the EMC case, the court found that the
deal documents make “clear that the parties
intended to limit Assured’s remedies for
breach of the representations and warranties
relating to the quality and characteristics
of the pooled loans to the re-purchase
protocol.” The limited remedy was to compel
EMC to re-purchase the loans that did
not comply with the representations and
warranties, and the court limited Assured’s
remedies in that manner.
In reaching its result, the court relied on Judge
Jed Rakoff’s opinion in the Flagstar case.13
There, the court ruled for Assured Guaranty
against Flagstar and awarded Assured more
than $90 million. The court found that “a
huge percentage of the loans in the two
pools were defective,” and many of the loans
had “blatant” defects. It also found that
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the sponsor “was made aware of Assured’s
claim of pervasive and material breaches
of the representations and warranties and,
therefore, had breached its contract with
Assured by failing to ‘re-purchase or cure’ the
materially defective loans,” as required by the
agreement between the parties. Flagstar has
since settled the case for over $100 million.
In light of these cases, monoline insurers
are expected to change deal documents
going forward. Most likely, they will not
be so willing to treat representations and
warranties as mere risk allocation devices
between the parties. As risk allocation
devices, the representations and warranties
typically make only limited remedies
available. Monoline insurers may demand
they be treated as something more- perhaps
as actual representations and warranties
about the underlying transaction that, if
breached, could lead to an unwinding of the
insurance policy.

CONCLUSION
The MBS upstream litigation is in its infancy.
Claims that prosecutors and plaintiffs
make are very serious. If banks, sponsors,
underwriters, appraisers and credit rating
agencies committed the purported wrongs,
the world was duped and has paid a
significant price for their wrongdoing. Many
of the cases will likely settle without a full
vetting of facts. If a few make it to trial,
full discovery will help publicize important
facts from the era preceding the financial
crisis. Those facts can help elucidate bad
behavior and perhaps point to a better way of
monitoring large financial transactions. The
decisions from courts can help discourage
such behavior in the future.
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